

GK SOCLIFE WORKING PAPERS SERIES

2
October 2010

**A two-dimensional approach to the political opportunity
structure of extreme right parties in Western Europe**

Dennis Spies
Research Training Group SOCLIFE
University of Cologne

Simon Franzmann
Chair for Comparative Politics
Institute for Data Archiving and Data Analysis
University of Cologne

A two-dimensional approach to the political opportunity structure of extreme right parties in Western Europe

Dennis Spies and Simon Franzmann

Abstract

Previous studies on the electoral fortunes of extreme right parties (ERPs) have pointed to the importance of variables of party competition for the success – or failure – of ERPs. These studies vary greatly when it comes to describing the political opportunity structure of the Extreme Right. Apart from their methodological differences, existing studies differ especially with regard to the assumed underlying dimension of party competition. In this article, we test the impact of three frequently discussed variables in the political opportunity structure of ERPs (mainstream party convergence, position of the established right and party system polarization) on the vote share of ERPs in Western Europe. In addition to examining previous studies in this field, we focus on the interplay between the economic and the cultural dimensions as part of the political opportunity structure. We show that a decrease in polarization with regard to economic questions is accompanied by a growing salience of ERPs' core issues, leading in the end to an increase in ERPs' vote share.

Introduction

Since the early 1980s, we have witnessed the rising success of niche parties and a decline in the vote share of mainstream parties across Europe. While for one group of these niche parties, namely the left-libertarian and green parties, this success is commonly explained by the rise of a “New Politics” or “post-materialist” dimension, the causes for the emergence of extreme right parties (ERPs) are disputed. The continuous electoral support for ERPs at the national, regional and local level was unexpected and has induced a great deal of scientific attention and efforts to explain the different fortunes of these parties at the polls. In the last several years, Ignazi’s (1992) hypothesis of a silent counter-revolution against the post-materialistic left has become increasingly popular. Accordingly, Bale (2003) emphasizes that the ERPs can be seen as the “ugly sisters” of the green parties, basing their success on the rise of the New Politics dimension by opposing the new left-libertarian politics. Bornschieer (2010) recently confirmed this insight by showing that New Left and New Right parties have driven the emergence of a new value conflict in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the way in which the simultaneous existence of the classical economic policy dimension and the “new” libertarian-authoritarian dimension affects ERPs’ electoral fate remains unexplored. In this article, we will explore the interplay between the economic and the cultural dimensions as part of the political opportunity structure. We will show that low polarization on economic questions is accompanied by a growing salience of ERPs’ core issues and leads in the end to an increase in ERPs’ vote share.

The literature on ERPs provides two lines of argumentation in order to explain the variance in ERPs’ electoral success across Western Europe. These are the individual characteristics and attitudes of ERP voters on the one hand and, on the other hand, context variables, which account for the special circumstances in which the act of voting takes place. As previous studies have shown, the individual characteristics that are correlated with the vote for an ERP are rather evenly distributed between Western European countries (Van der Brug et al., 2005). Therefore, most studies find evidence that it is the time- and country-specific national context which is responsible for the different levels of ERPs’ electoral support. Influenced by Herbert Kitschelt’s seminal study (Kitschelt, 1995), the political opportunity structure of ERPs is seen by many authors as one of the most important context variables that accounts for the varying electoral fortunes of the Extreme Right (Abedi, 2002; Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Carter, 2002, 2005; Golder, 2003, 2004; Meguid, 2005; Norris, 2005).

While there has been no consensus up to now on the elements of party competition which belong to the political opportunity structure of ERPs (Arzheimer, 2009), all studies analysing this question claim that the programmatic strategies of the established parties are crucial for the electoral success of the Extreme Right. Therefore, similarly to the analysis of niche parties undertaken by Meguid (2008), we will concentrate on the programmatic strategies of the mainstream parties to explain the electoral results of ERPs.

In order to analyse the impact of party strategies on ERPs' vote share, we have identified three frequently discussed variables from the literature: the convergence of the two mainstream parties, the position of the mainstream right party and the polarization of the party system. However, we are now faced with the next question: On which dimension of party competition should these variables be measured? Previous studies reveal three different answers to this question. Some studies assume an overall left-right dimension on which party competition takes place. Others argue that ERPs only compete with their mainstream competitors on their own core themes – namely: immigration, authoritarian values and anti-multiculturalism. Therefore, they consider the position of parties on a non-economic dimension to be the most important (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Ignazi, 2003b; Lubbers, 2002; Meguid, 2005). The third possible answer is that the economic dimension of party competition is crucial for the political opportunity structure of ERPs. As some authors argue (de Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 1995, 2007; Kitschelt and McGann, 2005), it is the market-liberal programmatic position of ERPs which is relevant for their voters, at least when considered alongside other, non-economic issues.

This article contributes to the ongoing debate on the political opportunity structure of ERPs in two important ways. Theoretically and empirically, it analyses the simultaneous effects of two dimensions of party competition, measured on two policy scales: an economic and a non-economic one. The convergence of the two mainstream parties, the position of the mainstream right party and the polarization of the party system are measured separately for each scale. This allows us to test which dimension of party competition is relevant for the political opportunity structure of ERPs. Methodologically, it uses data from all Western European countries and elections since 1980 to measure the impact of the three variables of party competition on the different dimensions.

The article is structured as follows: The first section discusses the multi-dimensionality of the political space in Western Europe and summarizes the main arguments concerning the relationship between the political opportunity structure of ERPs and their electoral success. These arguments are summarized into three hypotheses about the impact of

the different variables of party competition on the electoral results of ERPs. In the second section, we will operationalize and justify our dependent and independent variables as well as our statistical model. In section three, the proposed hypotheses will be tested empirically using data for Western Europe during the period from 1980 to 2003. We will discuss the implications of our findings in the conclusion.

2. The political opportunity structure of ERPs

The basic idea of all studies that refer to the political opportunity structure of ERPs is rather simple: Extreme Right Parties – like all other parties – have to compete with other parties for votes. This competition takes place in a specific national context which is defined by (1) the institutional setting, (2) the strategies of the competing mainstream parties, and (3) the socio-economic environment.¹ For our analysis, we will focus on the role of party strategies in the electoral fortunes of ERPs, thereby applying a narrow definition of the political opportunity structure.

Applying a practice that is widely accepted in the Western European context, we have used the left-right dichotomy in order to analyse the ideological space in which parties are acting. Left-right can be interpreted as a “super-issue” that absorbs all the different meanings of other issues (Inglehart, 1984; Kitschelt and Hellemans, 1990; Knutsen, 1998; Flanagan and Lee, 2003). This left-right super-issue is built on issues originating from different spheres. Of course, the ideological space can be separated into more than one dimension. Sartori (1976), although analysing the mechanics of party competition within a one-dimensional heuristic, already identified at least four dimensions. Sartori argues that analysing the most salient policy dimension is both sufficient and necessary in order to reduce the complexity of identifying the central mechanisms at work in party systems. While in the 1970s, the explanatory power of the one-dimensional left-right space was widely undisputed, this view has changed. Kitschelt (1994) has shown in several publications how the change in the European party systems can be fruitfully analysed by referring to both an economic left-right and an authoritarian-libertarian ideological axis. In a similar manner, Marks et al. (2006) detect different patterns of party competition in Western and Eastern Europe, referring to a socio-economic left-right dimension and a GAL-TAN dimension. The latter represents non-economic green, alternative and libertarian (GAL) issues at one pole and traditional, authoritarian and nationalistic (TAN) issues at the other pole. Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008) also

¹ Arzheimer and Carter (2006) refer to these variables as long-term, medium-term and short-term contextual factors.

identify a two-dimensional policy space with a cultural and an economic dimension. Using media data, they found that the cultural dimension has transformed its meaning since the 1970s by integrating the issue of immigration (Kriesi et al., 2006: 950). Finally, in a recent special issue on the structure of political competition in Western Europe, scholars confirm the finding of a two-dimensional space (Enyedi and Deegan-Krause, 2010: 417). According to this literature, we can assume that it is sufficient to model the ideological space of party competition using two such types of spheres, namely an economic one and a value-based, libertarian-authoritarian one.

We further assume that parties can position themselves more to the left or to the right by emphasizing particular issues belonging to one of these two spheres. Sometimes these issues will be formulated confrontationally, since one party claims the opposite of that which another party is advocating. Sometimes these issues represent core issues of one party that are ignored by the others. In taking this approach, we are combining thoughts of both confrontational and salience theory (cf. Budge, 2001; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Franzmann, 2009).² Our primary aim in this article is to show that analysing party competition in a two-dimensional way deepens our understanding of party strategies compared to a one-dimensional analysis. Even though the usefulness of analysing the political space in two dimensions is often discussed theoretically, there is a lack of empirical studies conducted in this way. Here we present a contribution intended to fill this gap by analysing the opportunity structure of ERPs.

How does the positioning of the established parties in these two dimensions affect the ERPs' vote share? In his seminal study on the Extreme Right in Western Europe, Herbert Kitschelt (1995) saw the growing success of ERPs as being caused by the end of industrial society. He claims that the transition to a post-industrial society has created a demand for both market-liberal issues and authoritative values from segments of the electorate in all Western European societies, therefore changing the demand side of party competition. ERPs have reacted to this new demand by combining market-liberal issues with authoritative issues, a combination which Kitschelt describes as the winning formula of ERPs. However, the success

² Note that our approach differs in important aspects from Meguid's (2008), although both approaches see the strategic decisions of parties as decisive. While Meguid (2008: 22-40) clearly separates left-right positions, issue-ownership and saliences from each other as strategic tools, we claim that emphasizing issues always has an effect on the positioning of a party. Hence, we do not separate these two strategic tools. Furthermore, Meguid (2008: 12-13 and 23) is sceptical about the explanatory power of sociological approaches and assumes that parties create new policy dimensions. Although we share her view of the importance of actors' behaviour in analysing party competition as well as in the activation of cleavages by parties, we do not dismiss sociological findings to the extent that she does. We assume that the evolution of "new" policy dimensions can be explained by value changes in the society (Inglehart, 1984; Flanagan/Lee, 2003), but for our analysis, this is an exogenous fact which parties can use strategically and is therefore part of the political opportunity structure.

of this winning formula does not depend solely on the programmatic appeals adopted by the ERPs themselves, but also on the programmatic appeals adopted by their mainstream competitors. Kitschelt argues that the more the mainstream parties converge in their programmes, the less ideologically distinct from each other they become, and as a result they offer ERPs more political space (Kitschelt, 2002). This leads us to our first hypothesis:

H1: The more the two mainstream parties converge, the greater the ERPs' vote share.

As we have already mentioned, Kitschelt's theoretical framework distinguishes between two dimensions of party competition, so the question emerges as to on which dimension of party competition this programmatic convergence should be measured. In a subsequent article, Kitschelt (2007: 1186) specifies that, in order to test the convergence thesis adequately, one should measure parties' positions solely on the economic dimension. While we share the view that both dimensions of party competition are equally important for analysing party competition, it should be noted that the relevance of economic-related issues for the ERPs' electoral success is contested by most other authors in the field (Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005), who claim that the non-economic dimension of party competition alone is of relevance for these parties. Many authors (Arzheimer, 2008; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2005) even argue that only some distinct non-economic core issues of ERPs are important for their electorates and therefore for their electoral success "...as it is primarily along this dimension that they compete with their mainstream rivals" (Arzheimer and Carter, 2003: 9). If this assumption is correct, H1 should not be tested by using parties' policy positions on the economic scale – as claimed by Kitschelt – but by analysing parties' positions on the non-material scale.

The relevance of non-economic issues alone is also advocated by Piero Ignazi (Ignazi, 1992, 1995, 2003a, 2003b). Since his assumptions about the dimensionality of the political opportunity structure of ERPs can also be found in various other studies (Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2008), we will briefly summarize his thoughts. Ignazi argues that the change to post-industrial societies leads to the development of non-economic values in parts of the electorate. The demand for these new right non-material issues – he names immigration, security and national identity – is seen as a time-lagged reaction to the appearance of new left non-material issues. According to Ignazi, the mainstream right parties had serious problems when they tried to incorporate the new right issues into their party platforms in the 1980s. In contrast to their mainstream competitors,

ERPs were able to take up these new issues in a more pronounced and radical way, which turned out to be more successful. However, the ERPs' radical adoption and representation of the new right's non-material issues was not sufficient for their electoral success. Equally important, according to Ignazi, was the previous failed attempt of the mainstream right parties to incorporate these new issues into their party platforms. By doing so, the mainstream right did succeed in establishing these new issues in the arena of political competition, legitimizing them in the eyes of the electorate and preparing the ground for the successful incorporation of these issues by the ERPs. Following Ignazi (2003b), we assume that the mainstream right can legitimize the non-material core issues of the ERPs by incorporating these issues into their own programmes. This leads us to our second hypothesis:

H2: The more the mainstream right party positions itself on the right, the greater the ERPs' vote share.

It should be noted that H2 theoretically demands that we measure of the position of the mainstream right party on a non-economic dimension alone. While this argument is plausible, there are equally good reasons to expect the opposite effect (Lubbers et al., 2002). In the tradition of Downs (1957), voters will cast their vote for the party which is closest to their own position in the political space. If both the mainstream and the Extreme Right Party are positioned close to the potential voters of the latter, these voters will have the possibility of choosing between them. In other words, the political space available for the ERP shrinks when the mainstream right positions itself near to its extreme right competitor.

One could argue, furthermore, that the radicalization of the mainstream right parties may lead to a higher degree of party system polarization. In an early publication, Ignazi (1992) states that strongly polarized party systems may be supportive for ERPs, since in these systems extreme positions – be they left or right – may also be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the electorate. While this argument is close to the argument developed in H2, the position of the mainstream right party alone is not sufficient to produce strong party system polarization, as the positions of all other parties also influence this variable. Therefore, we will measure the impact of polarization independently of the position of the mainstream right party, which leads us to our third hypothesis:

H3: The more polarized a party system is, the greater the ERPs' vote share.

Finally, while the hypotheses above can be tested independently for the each of the two dimensions of party competition, we assume that the simultaneous study of both dimensions will be superior to reducing our study to one dimension. We will therefore measure our three variables of party competition (convergence of the mainstream parties, position of the mainstream right party and party system polarization) on each of the two dimensions and assume possible interaction effects between them.

Let us sum up at this point: Previous studies on the political opportunity structure of ERPs agree that the strategies of the established parties are essential for the ERPs' electoral success. However, these studies differ with regard to the assumed dimensions of party competition as well as on the question of which variables of party competition should be accounted for. While most authors state that only some non-material core issues are important for the electoral fortunes of ERPs, others – mainly following Kitschelt – claim that an economic dimension of party competition might also be of relevance for the success or failure of ERPs. What has not yet been tested is which dimension of party competition is really decisive for explaining ERPs' electoral success. We will turn to this question in the subsequent analysis.

3. Model and variable description

In this section, we will discuss our case selection, our statistical model and the operationalizations of our main independent variable as well as of our control variables. We will concentrate our analysis on Western Europe and on the time period from 1980 to 2003. Since the rise of ERPs began in the early 1980s, we have chosen 1980 as the starting point of our analyses while the end point is defined by data availability. This leads us to a dataset which includes 17 countries and 18 party systems, as the Belgian regions of Flanders and Wallonia are treated as separate systems.³ Altogether, our dataset consists of 116 elections in these 18 party systems. Two Western European countries are excluded from our analysis: Malta and Switzerland. While the first is excluded for reasons of data availability, we have decided to exclude Switzerland for theoretical reasons. The prominence of direct democracy and the distinctiveness of government formation in Switzerland⁴ raise theoretical problems when this country is compared with others in terms of party competition. Because we are not

³ Since 1978, no party has competed for votes in both regions of Belgium in the national elections.

⁴ The special mode of government formation in Switzerland (*Zauberformel*) ensures that the five largest parties become members of the federal government. This makes it problematic to identify two mainstream parties, since in the Swiss case, one can plausibly speak of five mainstream parties.

interested in the electoral fate of a single party but in the whole vote share of the ERP party family in one country, the dependent variable is the sum of all ERPs' vote shares in a given election. Table 1 shows the parties identified as ERPs in each country.

As Table 1 indicates, we have also decided to include those countries where no ERP exists. As Golder (2003, 2004) and Jackman and Volpert (1996) have argued, the non-inclusion of these countries would cause a serious selection bias. We will therefore run a Tobit instead of an OLS model, as proposed by these authors. In our case, a Tobit model assumes that the dependent variable is left-censored at the value of zero and therefore also allows for the inclusion of elections where no ERP has contested for votes ($n=23$).⁵ We will perform our analysis at the macro-level, since we are interested only in the effect of different context variables. For the study of the opportunity structure this is an adequate procedure (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2005; Golder, 2003; Meguid, 2005).

According to our hypotheses presented above, we define three independent variables as: (1) the convergence of the two mainstream parties, (2) the position of the mainstream right party, and (3) the polarization of the party system. Each of these variables is measured separately on an economic, a non-economic and a general left-right dimension. As we have emphasized, each of the hypotheses developed in the previous section originally assumes either the economic (H1) or the non-economic dimension of party competition (H2 and H3) to be decisive. We will nonetheless test each hypothesis on each dimension. By doing so, we can also test the simultaneous impact of both dimensions.

In order to operationalize the variables of party competition, the most important data are left-right party positions. There are several methods for determining these positions, the most common being mass survey data, expert data and manifesto data. While each data source reveals its own advantages and disadvantages, expert data is seldom available for longer time periods. For the period of interest (1980 to 2003) there are a few expert surveys, but these are not comparable with one another (see Carter, 2005). Furthermore, we do not know which issues of party competition the experts have taken into account when locating parties on a left-right-scale, and often we do not even know whether the experts have judged electoral platforms or government behaviour, or both together. In a nutshell: We have no comparable

⁵ Using a Tobit model is theoretically appropriate only when one assumes that the variables that influence ERPs' vote share also influence the existence or non-existence of an extreme right party (Golder, 2003). While we know of only one study that directly addresses this question (O'Malley, 2008), we want to claim that the theoretical argumentation for a Tobit model is convincing. Alternatively, we have also estimated an OLS model without these 23 elections, as other studies have done (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2005; Meguid, 2005), and the results are to a large extent comparable.

dataset for left-right party positions based on expert surveys for the period from 1980 onwards. We are confronted with similar problems when we use public opinion surveys.

Table 1: Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe

Country	Extreme right parties	Vote Share in 1980*	Vote Share in 1990*	Vote Share in 2000*
Austria	Freedom Party (since 1986 classified as ERP)	-	16.6%	26.9%
Belgium (Flanders)	Flemish Block	1.1%	6.6%	10.1%
Belgium (Wallonia)	National Front	-	1.0%	1.5%
Denmark	Progress Party Danish People's Party	8.9%	6.4%	12.6%
Finland	True Finns (former Finnish Rural Party)	9.7%	4.8%	1.0%
France	National Front Movement for France	0.2%	9.6%	15.3%
Germany	Republicans National Democratic Party Union of German People	0.2%	4.0%	3.3%
Greece	National Political Union National Democratic Union National Alignment National Party Party of the Progressives	1.7%	0.1%	0.2%
Iceland	None	-	-	-
Ireland	None	-	-	-
Italy	Northern League Italian Social Movement (until 1995) National Alliance	6.8%	14.1%	16.3%
Luxembourg	None	-	-	-
Netherlands	Centre Party Centre Democrats List Pim Fortuyn	0.1%	0.9%	17.0%
Norway	Progress Party	4.5%	13.0%	14.6%
Portugal	National Renewal Party Christian Democratic Party	0.6%	0.6%	0.1%
Spain	National Alliance National Union	0.7%	0.1%	0.1%
Sweden	New Democracy	-	6.1%	0.2%
United Kingdom	National Front British National Party	0.1%	0.03%	1.5%

*If more than one ERP has contested for votes, the column reports the sum of vote shares for all parties regarded as ERPs.

Therefore, we decided to use CMP data to identify party policy positions. Different approaches are discussed in the literature (Kim and Fording, 1998; Gabel and Huber, 2000; Pappi and Shikano, 2004; Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006), and for our empirical analysis, we make use of the approach developed by Franzmann and Kaiser (2006). The most important advantage of this approach is that it allows us to account for time- and country-specific meanings of the terms “left” and “right” by identifying positional (either left or right) and non-confrontational issues of party competition (Stokes, 1963).⁶ Parties’ left-right values are then measured on the basis of the salience of these three issue types, leading us to determine party positions between 0 (leftmost) and 10 (rightmost).⁷ This left-right scale consists of all possible CMP categories. Moreover, with this approach, it is also possible to construct our two subordinated dimensions. Party values on the economic scale are measured on the basis of all economic-related CMP categories,⁸ while all other categories have been assigned to the non-economic scale.

We then measure the level of *mainstream party convergence* on a left-right scale from 0 to 10, which theoretically leads to a range of values from 0 (minimal convergence) to 10 (perfect convergence). In line with H1, we expect that higher levels of programmatic convergence will lead to higher vote shares for parties of the Extreme Right. In order to test H2, it is sufficient to concentrate on the *position of the mainstream right party* alone. As we stated above, this variable might be positively or negatively related to the ERPs’ vote share. Finally, H3 assumes a legitimating function caused by high *party system polarization*. In line with this argument, we assume a positive relationship between our polarization variable and the ERPs’ vote share. We measure party system polarization using the formula first proposed by Sigelman and Yough (1978).¹⁰

⁶ This differentiation leads to some interesting results with regard to the ERPs’ core issues, as they have been identified by different previous studies (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Meguid, 2005). Analysing all OECD countries, per606 (national way of life: positive) turns out to be a right issue in 21 of 26 countries but can be regarded as a valence (non-confrontational) issue in Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and Wallonia. Per605 (law and order) can be regarded as a left issue in Flanders and as a valence issue in Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Turkey, Portugal and the USA (Franzmann, 2009: 130-31).

⁷ Technical details are explained in Franzmann and Kaiser (2006).

⁸ For the economic scale, we have used all categories of CMP domain 4 (economy) and the following additional categories: per303, per503, per504, per505 and per701, per702, per703 and per704.

⁹ We define as *mainstream parties* the two parties that have gained the largest and second largest vote shares at a given election (1st criterion). In order to test the convergence thesis (H1 and H2), we distinguish between a left and a right mainstream party. To be regarded as a left/right mainstream party, a party must comply with the 1st criterion and must be placed to the left/right of the other mainstream party on our left-right dimension over the whole period (2nd criterion).

¹⁰ The formula reads: $P = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i (x_i - \bar{x})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i}$ where p_i is a party’s vote share at a given election, x_i is this party’s position on a given dimension, and \bar{x} is the weighted mean of the positions of all parties on this

As we stated initially, our definition of the political opportunity structure is restricted to variables of party competition. While we are only interested in the effects of these variables, we also have included four additional variables in our model. These are the *disproportionality of the electoral system*, the *degree of institutional federalism*, the *unemployment rate* and the *share of the foreign-born population*. These four variables are well-established in the research on the political opportunity structure of ERPs and are therefore taken as control variables. We have also added country dummies in our model to control for unobserved country-specific characteristics.

The disproportionality of the electoral system is measured using the index developed by Gallagher (1991), which assigns higher values to more disproportional systems. Although other studies have used more detailed variables to define the electoral system, including electoral thresholds, district magnitudes and upper-tier percentages (Carter, 2002; Golder, 2003; Norris, 2005), we prefer the Gallagher index because it gives an impression of the overall level of disproportionality. Since ERPs are rather small parties, we expect that they – like all other minor parties – will benefit from a more proportional electoral system.

The impact of federalism on ERPs' electoral fortunes was a subject first raised by Arzheimer and Carter (2003, 2006). On the one hand, ERPs might benefit from a federal state structure, as this may allow them to rely on additional resources when they perform well in subnational elections. On the other hand, these subnational elections might act as a filter for political protest. Voters may want to show their dislike of the mainstream parties' programmes by voting for an ERP, but will do so only in subnational elections, which they perceive as being of minor importance compared to the national elections analysed here. Therefore, the degree of federalism as measured by Lijphart (1999) might be positively or negatively correlated with ERPs' vote share.

In addition to these two institutional variables, we have also included two socio-economic context factors: the unemployment rate and the share of the foreign-born population. Both variables can be expected to have a positive impact on ERPs' election results. For data on the standardized unemployment rate, we have used the dataset assembled by Armingeon et al. (2008) and for the share of the foreign-born population, data offered by the OECD.¹¹

dimension. \bar{X} is calculated by multiplying the vote share by the ideological position of a party. This step is repeated for each party in the party system and finally, these values are summed up.

¹¹ We obtained our data on international migration flows from the *OECD Database on International Migration* [www.oecd.org].

4. Results

We will now test the impact of the variables of party competition that we developed above. For our analysis, we have used data for all elections to national parliaments in Western Europe from 1980 to 2003 (n=116). Our dependent variable is the vote share of parties which we consider to belong to the Extreme Right. As we will later control for possible interaction effects between our party competition variables, we have centred all independent variables on their mean.

Altogether, we have specified eight different models. Models 1 to 5 report the main effects of our independent variables, Models 6 to 8 control for possible interaction effects between these variables. All models reported in Table 2 also include country dummies (not shown), and therefore only account for intra-country variation of the dependent variable. We have also estimated the same models without country dummies, and the main findings are not affected (see Table 3, Appendix).

Model 1 includes only the four control variables for the disproportionality of the electoral system, the degree of federalism, the unemployment rate and the rate of foreign-born population. Models 2 to 5 include our three party competition variables: the convergence between the two mainstream parties, the position of the mainstream right party and the party system polarization variable. Each model tests the impact of these variables on a different dimension of party competition: Model 2 on a left-right scale, Model 3 on an economic and Model 4 on a purely non-economic dimension. Model 5 then includes the three variables of party competition measured simultaneously on both the economic and the non-economic dimension, which leads to six variables in this case. Finally, Models 6 to 8 control for possible interaction effects between the variables measured on the two different dimensions.

With regard to our control variables, only the share of the foreign-born population is significantly and positively correlated with the ERPs' vote share in all models, a result which supports the findings of previous studies (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 2002; Golder, 2003; Kessler and Freeman, 2005). The degree of electoral disproportionality, measured by Gallagher's index, turns out to be significant in three of the eight models. As the index uses higher values for more disproportional electoral systems, this result was rather surprising. Therefore, we have replaced this variable with another one, district magnitude, but the result remains the same: ERPs seem to be more successful in disproportional electoral systems.¹²

¹² While the impact of the disproportionality of the electoral system has been analysed extensively by different authors (Carter, 2002; Golder, 2003; Norris, 2005), only Golder's study also analyses elections where no ERPs were present. While Golder finds evidence that ERPs actually benefit from more proportional electoral systems –

Turning to our party competition variables, Model 2 shows the results for an overall left-right dimension. Here, all three variables of party competition are significant and positively correlated with ERPs' vote share, giving support to H1, H2 and H3. ERPs are more successful if the two mainstream parties show high levels of convergence, if the mainstream right party places itself more to the right, and if the party system is highly polarized. These findings support previous studies that also used a left-right dimension to measure the variables of party competition (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2005, Kitschelt, 1995). Models 3 to 5 show what happens if we split the left-right dimension into an economic and a non-economic dimension of party competition. Several points are striking and need further attention.

First, regarding the part-scales separately, we find significant correlations only for the non-economic dimension of party competition, while none of the economic-related variables reaches common levels of statistical significance. Up to this point, our findings support those studies that have only focused on the non-material core issues of ERPs and measured party system competition solely on a non-economic dimension (Lubbers et al., 2002; Meguid, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009). But, as we will see later, the simultaneous analysis of the two part-scales (Model 5) reveals that indicators from both dimensions have a statistically significant effect on ERPs' vote share.

Second, Kitschelt's convergence thesis turns out to be significant only for the non-economic dimension of party competition, supporting H1. The variable which measured the convergence on an economic dimension turns out to be insignificant, and this is the case for every model where it is included. The significant test for the left-right convergence (Model 2) therefore results from the inclusion of the non-economic dimension alone. This contradicts Kitschelt's expectation (2007) that the convergence variable should only be measured, and would only have an impact, on the economic dimension.

the opposite of our finding – his period of analysis is from 1970-2002. Reanalysing his data, we found that the statistical significance of his (dis)proportionality variables is due to the inclusion of the elections before 1980 and turns out to be insignificant (but still positively correlated) for the period from 1980-2002.

Table 2: Estimates of Tobit models (with country dummies)

Regressor		Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)
Disproportionality		.361* (.182)	.292* (.183)	.372* (.183)	.228 (.169)	.203 (.167)	.151 (.164)	.224 (.170)	.086 (.170)
Federalism		2.255* (1.239)	1.787 (1.289)	2.462* (1.312)	.647 (1.174)	.979 (1.200)	1.224 (1.170)	1.007 (1.199)	1.032 (1.169)
Unemployment		.026 (.174)	-.050 (.169)	.003 (.178)	.051 (.159)	.003 (.159)	-.056 (.157)	-.002 (.159)	-.070 (.158)
Foreign-born population		.867** (.217)	.627* (.255)	.819** (.228)	.847** (.219)	.738** (.216)	.732* (.210)	.769* (.220)	.737* (.210)
General Left-Right Scale									
Convergence		-	3.125* (1.413)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Position Mainstream Right		-	2.275* (1.214)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Party System Polarisation		-	1.461* (.733)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Economic Scale									
Convergence		-	-	-.202 (1.074)	-	.334 (1.004)	.869 (.999)	.494 (1.028)	1.236 1.047
Position Mainstream Right		-	-	.990 (.915)	-	1.724* (.847)	1.675* (.824)	1.845* (.864)	2.166* (.845)
Party System Polarisation		-	-	-.534 (.461)	-	-.713 (.432)	-.125 (.479)	-.718 (.432)	-.186 (.473)
Non-Economic Scale									
Convergence		-	-	-	2.645** (.760)	2.631** (.7518)	2.861** (.742)	2.579** (.753)	2.891** (.744)
Position Mainstream Right		-	-	-	.448 (.674)	.459 (.667)	.082 (.665)	.507 (.671)	.144 (.662)
Party System Polarisation		-	-	-	2.593** (.587)	2.797** (.571)	3.462** (.615)	2.769** (.572)	3.528** (.635)
Interaction Effects of both part scales									
Convergence		-	-	-	-	-	-.523* (.204)	-	-
Position Mainstream Right		-	-	-	-	-	.188 (.275)	-	-
Party System Polarisation		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.272* (.113)
Country dummies		Not displayed							
Sigma		3.589 (.264)	3.453 (.253)	3.510 (.258)	3.246 (.238)	3.095 (.227)	3.008 (.220)	3.090 (.227)	3.011 (.221)
Log pseudo-likelihood		-254.65	-250.64	-252.85	-244.05	-239.96	-236.66	-239.72	-237.11
N		116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116
Non-censored		93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
Left-censored		23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

Third, the position of the mainstream right party (H2) does not have any significant impact on the vote for ERPs, regardless of the assumed dimension of party competition. While the impact of this variable on the non-economic dimension is positive and would confirm H2, it does not reach common levels of statistical significance. However, when we include both dimensions simultaneously (Model 5), the position of the mainstream right party on the economic dimension turns out to be positively correlated with our dependent variable.

Fourth, party system polarization turns out to be significantly and positively correlated with the dependent variable only on the non-economic dimension, thereby confirming H3. This effect of non-economic polarization is even stronger than the effect of the general left-

right polarization, and it increases even more in a simultaneous analysis of the economic and the non-economic dimensions. Focussing separately on one dimension obviously leads to an underestimation of the impact of non-economic polarization. As we discussed above, this finding supports Ignazi's argument: Party systems that are highly polarised on non-economic issues seem to legitimize extreme positions. While Ignazi gives no explanation for the converse impact of party system polarization on the different sub-dimensions, we propose the following explanation: Voters compare the positions of parties on the two dimensions independently from each other. If the non-economic dimension is more polarized, the policy options that the different parties offer to the electorate are more distinct, and a vote decision based on this dimension would guarantee voters the greatest impact in terms of the expected policies. By contrast, a party system that is more polarized on economic issues would lead voters to make their voting decisions on basis of their economic preferences, which should disadvantage the ERPs, who do not "own" economic issues. The negative – though insignificant – coefficients of the polarization variable measured on the economic dimension are in line with this argumentation.

Fifth, although the direct effects of the economic-related variables of party competition are all non-significant, it is too early to conclude that the economic dimension of party competition is unimportant for the electoral fortunes of ERPs. It may be the case that the economic-related variables moderate the effect of the non-economic related variables, an assumption which we control for in Models 6 to 8 by adding interaction effects to our model. It turns out that both the impact of convergence between the two mainstream parties and party system polarization on the non-economic dimension are moderated by the values of the corresponding variables on the economic dimension. The coefficients for both product terms are negative: With higher values measured for these variables on the economic dimension, the effects of the corresponding variables on the non-economic dimension of the dependent variable decrease. While the coefficients in Table 3 only show the significance of the product term at one value, we have additionally calculated conditional slopes reported in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1: Effect of the convergence on the non-economic scale for different values of the convergence on the economic scale





Figure 2: Effect of polarization on the non-economic scale for different values of the polarization on the economic scale



Sixth, in light of our analysis of the two interaction effects, we conclude that the economic dimension of party competition is important for the electoral fortunes of ERPs, since it moderates the effect of the non-economic dimension. While our research design has focused

solely on the party system level and therefore does not allow us to draw any conclusions for the individual level, one explanation for the identified interaction effects may be that voters are able to separate the two dimensions of party competition when they decide which party to vote for. In party systems that are highly polarized on economic issues, voters might regard these issues as more important than the non-economic core issues of ERPs, because the expected differences in outcome are greater when they base their voting decisions on economic preferences. In contrast, voters might have a greater incentive to make their voting decisions on the basis of their non-material preferences if they do not see great differences between the parties on the economic dimension. The accentuation and polarization of economic issues may therefore discredit the ERPs' appeal to non-economic issues. Focussing only on the impact of non-economic issues when analysing the political opportunity structure of ERPs, as has been done by most previous studies in the field, might therefore be a misleading approach.

5. Discussion and conclusion

Building upon the theoretical considerations of previous studies, this article has developed three hypotheses concerning the political opportunity structure of ERPs. In order to test these hypotheses, unlike previous studies, we have not only made a distinction between an economic and a non-economic dimension of party competition, but have also carefully inspected the interplay of both dimensions. Our approach allowed us to include elections in which no ERP participated, and the results of our empirical analysis indicate that both dimensions of party competition are important for the political opportunity structure of ERPs. On the non-economic dimension, the convergence of the mainstream parties and a high level of party system polarization have been found to increase ERPs' vote share. Because we have only found effects of the economic dimension in models which simultaneously analysed factors belonging to both dimensions, our results signify that economic-related variables moderate the effects of the non-economic-related variables and are therefore important for the political opportunity structure of ERPs.

With regard to these findings, we want to address two questions. The first refers to the general analysis of party competition in a multi-dimensional policy space, while the second is more specific, referring to the opportunity structure of the ERPs.

First, our results clearly confirm that analysing only the general left-right dimension is not sufficient for understanding what happens in contemporary party systems. Only if we distinguish between an economic and a non-economic dimension are we able to determine

different ways of explaining ERPs' electoral success. Analysing just one of these dimensions is also not sufficient. We clearly show that the interaction of the two dimensions is decisive. Focussing only on one dimension leads to an underestimation of their effects. We assume that this is generally true for all kinds of analyses of party competition.

Second, concerning the question of whether the economic or the non-economic dimension of party competition is the most important part of the opportunity structure for ERPs, our analysis has shown that the interplay of party strategies on the two independent policy dimensions has a significant influence on the electoral fortunes of ERPs. Like most authors, we think that the core issues of ERPs clearly belong to the non-economic sphere. But only when polarization over economic questions is low do ERPs face an opportunity structure which allows them to successfully attract voters with their core issues. Conversely, in party systems where economic issues are both highly salient and polarized, ERPs are confronted with an unfavourable opportunity structure which impedes them from attracting voters with their issues.¹³

Therefore, future research on ERPs should not restrict itself to the analysis of a set of core issues of ERPs, but should consider economic issues of party competition as well. While we have focused our interest on the competitors of ERPs, the question of whether and how the ERPs make use of their specific political opportunity structure – e.g., by emphasizing only issues which are confrontational for the mainstream parties – should attract closer attention.

¹³ This consideration suggests that in Germany, the rise of the *Linkspartei* and the dominance of economic issues after reunification have prevented the German party system from developing a successful ERP at the national level, despite having a considerable share of voters within the electorate who support ERP policy positions – especially in eastern Germany and in parts of the south. The comparatively high level of post-materialist attitudes among the German electorate reveals that there is strong potential for a rise in the importance of non-economic issues for the policy agenda. Given that the German mainstream parties – Christian Democrats and Social Democrats – have narrowed the gap between their policy positions on the non-economic dimension (Franzmann, 2008), we expect that with a further reduction in polarization on the economic dimension, the probability of a successful ERP will rise.

References

- Abedi, Amir. 2002. Challenges to Established Parties: The Effects of Party System Features on the Electoral Fortunes of Anti-Political-Establishment Parties. *European Journal of Political Research* 41(4): 551-583.
- Armington, Klaus, Marlène Gerber, Philipp Leimgruber, Michelle Beyeler. 2008. *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2006*. University of Berne: Institute of Political Science.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2008. Protest, Neo-Liberalism or Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: What Motivates the Voters of the Extreme Right in Western Europe? *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften* 2(2): 173-197.
- Arzheimer, Kai. 2009. Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe 1980-2002. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 259-275.
- Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter. 2003. Explaining Variation in the Extreme Right Vote: The Individual and the Political Environment. *Keele European Parties Research Unit (KEPRU)*. Working Paper 19. Keele: Keele University.
- Arzheimer, Kai and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success. *European Journal of Political Research* 45(3): 419-443.
- Bale, Tim. 2003. Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe's Bipolarising Party Systems. *West European Politics* 26(3): 67-90.
- Bornschieer, Simon. 2010. The New Cultural Divide and the Two-Dimensional Political Space in Western Europe. *West European Politics* 33(3): 419-444.
- Budge, Ian. 2001. Theory and Measurement of Party Policy Positions. In *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998*, ed. Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum, 75-92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carter, Elisabeth. 2002. Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties. *West European Politics* 25(3): 125-146.
- Carter, Elisabeth. 2005. *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cole, Alexandra. 2005. Old Right or New Right? The Ideological Positioning of Parties of the Far Right. *European Journal of Political Research* 44(2): 203-230.
- de Lange, Sarah L.. 2007. A New Winning Formula? The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right. *Party Politics* 13(4): 411-435.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Enyedi, Zsolt and Kevin Deegan-Krause. 2010. Introduction: The Structure of Political Competition in Western Europe. *West European Politics* 33(3): 415-418.
- Flanagan, Scott and Aie-Rie Lee. 2003. The New Politics, Culture Wars, and the Authoritarian-Libertarian Value Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 36(2): 235-270.
- Franzmann, Simon and André Kaiser. 2006. Locating Political Parties in Policy Space: A Reanalysis of Party Manifesto Data. *Party Politics* 12(2): 163-188.
- Franzmann, Simon. 2008. Programmatische Konvergenz innerhalb der westeuropäischen Parteifamilien? Ein Vergleich von christ- und sozialdemokratischen Parteien in Europa. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 37(1): 79-98.
- Franzmann, Simon. 2009. *The Change of Ideology: How the Left-Right Cleavage Transforms into Issue Competition: An Analysis of Party Systems using Party Manifesto Data*. PhD Thesis. Cologne: KUPS: <http://kups.uni-koeln.de/volltexte/2010/3033/>

- Gabel, Matthew J. and John D. Huber. 2000. Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 94-103.
- Gallagher, Michael. 1991. Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies* 10(1): 33-51.
- Golder, Matt. 2003. Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 36(4): 432-466.
- Golder, Matt. 2004. Electoral Institutions, Unemployment and Extreme Right Parties: A Correction. *British Journal of Political Science* 33(3): 525-534.
- Ignazi, Pierro. 1992. The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 22(1): 3-34.
- Ignazi, Pierro. 1995. The Re-emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe. Vienna: Institut für Höhere Studien und Wissenschaftliche Forschung.
- Ignazi, Pierro. 2003a. The Development of the Extreme Right at the End of the Century. In *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, 143-158. London: Frank Cass.
- Ignazi, Pierro. 2003b. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1984. The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society. In *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?*, ed. Russel. J. Dalton, Scott. C. Flanagan and Paul A. Beck, 25-69. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jackman, Robert and Karin Volpert. 1996. Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. *British Journal of Politics* 26, 501-521.
- Kessler, Alan E. and Gary P. Freeman. 2005. Support for Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Western Europe: Individual Attributes, Political Attitudes, and National Context. *Comparative European Politics* 3(3): 261-288.
- Kim, Heemin. and Richard C. Fording. 1998. Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989. *European Journal of Political Research* 33(1): 73-97.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science* 16: 57-85.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 2002. Popular Dissatisfaction with Democracy: Populism and Party Systems. In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, ed. Yves Meny and Yves Surel, 179-196. Houndsmill: Palgrave.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 2007. Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial Democracies: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research. *West European Politics* 30(5): 1176-1206.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. and Anthony J. McGann. 2005. The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ. *Party Politics* 11(2): 147-171.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. and Staf Helleman. 1990. The Left-Right Semantics and the New Politics Cleavage. *Comparative Political Studies* 23(2): 210-238.
- Knigge, Pia. 1998. The Ecological Correlates of Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 34: 249-279.
- Knutsen, Oddbjorn. 1998. Expert Judgements of the Left-Right Location of Political Parties: A Comparative Longitudinal Study. *West European Politics* 21(2): 63-94.

- Kriesi, Hans-Peter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Giugni. 1995. *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. London: University College Press.
- Kriesi, Hans-Peter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Tomotheos Frey. 2006. Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared. *European Journal of Political Research* 45(6): 921–956.
- Kriesi, Hans-Peter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Tomotheos Frey. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lubbers, Marcel., Mèrove Gijsberts and Peer Scheepers. 2002. Extreme Right-wing Voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 41(3): 345-378.
- Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson and Erica Edwards. 2006. Party Competition and European Integration in East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality. *Comparative Political Studies* 39(2): 155-75.
- Meguid, Bonnie M. 2005. Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success. *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 347-359.
- Meduid, Bonnie M. 2008. *Competition between Unequals. Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Malley, Eoin. 2008. Why is there no Radical Right Party in Ireland? *West European Politics* 31(5): 960-977.
- Pappi, Franz-Urban and Susumu Shikano. 2004. Ideologische Signale in den Wahlprogrammen der deutschen Bundestagsparteien 1980 bis 2002. Working Paper No. 76. Mannheim: *Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung*.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sigelman, Lee and Syng Nam Yough. 1978. Left-Right Polarization in National Party Systems. *Comparative Political Studies* 11(3): 355-79.
- Stokes, David E. 1963. Spatial Models of Party Competition. *American Political Science Review* 57(2): 368-377.
- Van der Brug, Wouter and Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie. 2005. Why Some Anti-Immigrant Parties Fail and Others Succeed: A Two-Step Model of Aggregate Electoral Support. *Comparative Political Studies* 38(5): 537-573.
- Veugelers, John W. P. and André Magnan. 2005. Conditions of Far-right Strength in Contemporary Western Europe: An Application of Kitschelt's Theory. *European Journal of Political Research* 44(6): 837-860.

Appendix

Table 3: Estimates of Tobit models (without country dummies)

Regressor		Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)	Model (7)	Model (8)
Disproportionality		.426* (.154)	.394* (.159)	.418** (.156)	.386* (.162)	.383* (.164)	.356* (.158)	.349* (.162)	.347* (.163)
Federalism		2.685** (.611)	2.752** (.635)	2.780** (.624)	2.640** (.619)	2.695** (.632)	2.255* (.644)	2.538* * .623	2.445** (.652)
Unemployment		-.418* (.177)	-.399* (.182)	-.334* (.193)	-.349* (.185)	-.338* (.195)	-.431* (.191)	-.382* (.193)	-.321 (.193)
Foreign-born population		-.377* (.180)	-.366* (.200)	-.346* (.186)	-.392* (.200)	-.379* (.204)	-.499* (.224)	-.383* (.197)	-.430* (.222)
General Left-Right Scale	Convergence	-	1.296 (1.068)	-					
	Position Mainstream Right	-	-.002 (1.015)	-					
	Party System Polarisation	-	1.577* (.703)	-					
Economic Scale	Convergence	-	-	-.341 (.816)		-.447 (.887)	.139 (.879)	-.827 (.897)	-.438 (.872)
	Position Mainstream Right	-	-	-.449 (.568)		-.075 (.585)	.387 (.589)	-.148 (.579)	.026 (.579)
	Party System Polarisation	-	-	.244 (.522)		-.102 (.536)	.383 (.546)	-.145 (.527)	.041 (.534)
Non-Economic Scale	Convergence	-	-		1.534 (.941)	1.796* (1.074)	1.683 1.039	1.852* (1.055)	1.718 (1.063)
	Position Mainstream Right	-	-		.761 (.835)	.785 (.840)	.756 (.815)	.939 (.830)	.714 (.832)
	Party System Polarisation	-	-		1.562* (.750)	1.605* (.808)	2.216* (.807)	1.517* (.796)	1.901* (.811)
Interaction Effects of both part scales	Convergence	-	-			-	-.936** (.317)	-	-
	Position Mainstream Right	-	-			-	-	-.639 (.369)	-
	Party System Polarisation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.349* (.184)
Country dummies		No dummies							
Sigma		6.827 (.512)	6.723 (.503)	6.823 (.512)	6.672 (.499)	6.655 (.499)	6.412 (.479)	6.546 (.491)	6.543 (.494)
Log pseudo-likelihood		-325.86	-323.10	- 325.101	-322.83	-322.68	-318.37	- 321.19	-320.88
N		116	116	116	116	116	116	116	116
Non-censored		93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
Left-censored		23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

Editor

Dr. Romana Careja

Editorial Board

Professor Dr. Hans-Jürgen Andreß

Professor Dr. Detlef Fetchenhauer

Professor Dr. Karsten Hank

Professor Dr. Martina Fuchs

Professor Dr. Clemens Fuest

Professor Dr. David A. Jaeger

Professor Dr. Wolfgang Jagodzinski

Professor Dr. André Kaiser

Professor Dr. Heiner Meulemann,

Professor Dr. Angelika Nußberger

Professor Dr. Sigrid Quack

Professor Dr. Ingo Rohlfing

Professor Dr. Frank Schultz-Nieswandt

Professor Dr. Friedrich Schmid

Professor Dr. Michael Wagner

The GK SOCLIFE working paper series are published by the Research Training Group SOCLIFE, an interdisciplinary research training group, which is at the crossroads between social and economic sciences, statistics and law. The Research Training Group SOCLIFE develops under the aegis of the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of Cologne. The working papers are meant to share work in progress before formal publication. The aim of the series is to promote conceptual, methodological and substantial discussion between the members of SOCLIFE and the larger scholar community.

The Research Training Group SOCLIFE focuses on quantitative cross-national comparisons, which simultaneously analyse the influences of individual-level factors and of country-level factors on attitudes and behaviours.

Submissions. Papers are invited from all the members of Research Training Group SOCLIFE, and also from other interested scholars. All papers are subject to review by one member of the Editorial Board. Papers can be submitted either in English or in German. Authors interested in including their work in the GK SOCLIFE series may send their papers to soclifeworkingpaperseries@wiso.uni-koeln.de.

Access. The working papers series can be accessed at <http://www.soclifekoeln.de/index.php?id=11863>. Comments on the papers should be sent directly to the authors.

All rights reserved.

<http://www.soclifekoeln.de/index.php?id=11863>