

# **Social Order and Life Chances in Cross-National Comparison**

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**Research and Study Program**

English Summary

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## Short Summary

Cross-national comparisons in social sciences mostly regard either persons within countries *or* global indicators for countries. The first approach uses harmonized surveys as a data source; the second approach uses aggregate data. Both approaches have their weaknesses. As correlations of qualities of persons vary between countries, they can be interpreted as general laws only with regard to the higher level – that is, if the variations can be explained by characteristics of the countries. As correlations between statistics of countries lack reference to identifiable actors, they can be interpreted only with regard to the lower level – that is, if they can be understood as resulting from actions of natural or corporate actors.

The graduate program combines both approaches by analyzing the impact of *life chances* on *choices* of actions or attitudes of natural or corporate actors within the frame of the *social order* of politics, economics, civil society and culture of countries. As for *research*, general hypotheses on the impact of the social order, the social structure and the social history of countries on actors within countries will be developed and be examined by multi-level analysis. The *teaching program* will (1) guide students to specify such hypotheses for their own research projects, (2) teach them the appropriate analytical strategies and statistical techniques, and (3) make them acquainted with both approaches and data sources.

# 1 Research Program

## 1.1 Approach and General Question

There have been two traditions of empirical social research since its beginnings in the early 20th century.

On the one hand, differences of resources or *life chances* between members of national societies – such as money, prestige or educational credentials – have been investigated; they define a range of options for attitudes, yet do not determine them as well as actions. In this tradition, nationally representative samples of several countries (Almond / Verba 1963, Inglehart / Welzel 2005, Norris / Inglehart 2004) are analyzed in order to find how strongly and by which mechanisms life chances affect attitudes and actions. On the other hand, modernization research has investigated how the institutional frame of national societies has been developed. In this tradition, typologies of countries have been developed (Esping-Andersen 1990, Janoski 1998, Delhey 2001, Höpner 2007) and quantitative global measures have been collected in order to assess a country's capacity of self governance.

The *Graduiertenkolleg* intends to combine these two traditions under the general question of how the context of national societies affects the impact of life chances on actors, that is, on their attitudes and actions. Actors in this context are persons as well as corporations, such as parties or firms. Both have a certain amount of life chances and aim to achieve certain goals by using them (Scharpf 1997: 51-68, Kaiser 2001).

In the following, the meaning of national context will be explained through a basic grid which serves as a background for the development of macro-social hypotheses of the projects (section 1.2). Then, steps of research common to all projects (section 1.2) and finally each of the projects will be introduced (section 1.3).

## 1.2 A Basic Grid of National Contexts

National contexts can be seen in different *perspectives* with reference to different *domains of social life*. The perspectives focus on social order, social structure, and social history. The domains of social life are politics, economics, civil society, and culture. Crossing both provides a basic grid of national contexts. Table 1 presents both dimensions and examples in each cell.

**Table 1. Basic Grid: Perspectives and Domains of Social Life**

	<i>Politics</i>	<i>Economics</i>	<i>Civil Society</i>	<i>Culture</i>
<i>Social Order</i>	Constitution	Property Right	Family Right	School Forms
<i>Social Structure</i>	Party System	Labor Relations	Stratification	Educational Demand
<i>Social History</i>	Democratic Tradition	Growth	New „Private Living Forms“	Educational Expansion

### 1.2.1 Perspectives

#### *Social Order: Representations and Constitutions*

Following Weber (1964: 22) and Coleman (1990: 40, 50), the social order may be understood as the totality of the interrelated *representations* of “oughts” governing the coexistence in some social grouping. In this definition, the term order contains the two readings of interrelation and of “ought to” already implicit in everyday language. Interrelation means that representations are brought together so that common elements are detected and contradictions are at least partly solved. At the same time, social order is more and less than the sum of the institutions of a society – less insofar as it contains the fundamental institutions only, more insofar as representations of some ought are interrelated. Yet some “ought to” is the substance of a social order as well as of its institutions. Both determine what must be done and must not be done – that is, norms.

Norms are valid only insofar as the majority of a society shares some representations which are identifiable through language. In language formulas, different readings and meanings can be discerned, disagreements detected and consensuses established. Yet because such processes cannot continue indefinitely, some, certainly not all, representations must be cast in the legal form of a *constitution*, that is, fundamental rules for a social grouping. Thus, the constitution rests upon representations, but also creates some reality beyond representations. The legal form delineates some smaller, yet more definitely determined area of the constitution within the social order. In brief, the representations of the people and the constitution of their social grouping determine the rules of the social order.

Insofar as the social order contains some ought, it is a *normative* orientation for action and can be juxtaposed to the social structure and the social history which are *factual* points of orientation for action.

#### *Social Structure and Social History*

The *social structure* results from distributions of properties of *persons* or *organizations*. It is described by measures of central tendency, as e.g. the Gini-coefficient to measure social inequality. These in turn can be seen as *opportunity structures* in which people act and develop attitudes.

Insofar as the social structure refers to *persons*, it is derived from the aggregation of opportunities to a corresponding measure of an opportunity *structure*. The relevance of the latter for actions is not immediately obvious. For persons act primarily according to their individually given opportunities, their opportunity profile – for example, as woman, graduate, service worker and so forth. Therefore, to derive some impact of an opportunity structure on actions and attitudes is more demanding than to derive the impact of the corresponding property in an opportunity profile. For the measures of opportunity structures are indicators of social processes not directly observed (Erbring / Young 1979). Two examples will clarify this: In contrast to a person being a foreigner, the percentage of foreigners in a country does affect life chances not directly, but as an indicator – either of the perception of foreigners and the responses of the natives toward them or of the interactions between both groups in the country. And: Unemployment impairs the well-being of the unemployed person; yet rates of unemployment indicate insecurity on the labour market and impair the well-being of the people employed.

Insofar as the social structure refers to *organizations*, its impact on actions is more easily determined: Their supplies constitute an opportunity structure. The number and kind of associa-


tions frame the decision to join and to cooperate; the number of insolvencies and of state subsidies delimits the space to start a business.

The *social history* embraces events and cumulative developments of a national society. Yesterday's *events* may affect attitudes and actions even today. For example, the suppression of churches in state socialism still reduces religious beliefs in East European as compared to West European countries (Meulemann 2004). Cumulative developments affect the opportunities of each and everybody. For example, the gross national product affects the life satisfaction (Fahey / Smith 2004) or the political interest (van Deth / Elff 2004) of the people. Similarly, the longevity of a democracy affects political participation in the society.

### ***Social Order as the Primary Perspective***

The social order of a national society is the *normative* reference point for actions and attitudes while social structure and social history restrict *factual* opportunity structures. As the impact of norms can be straightforwardly translated into corresponding hypotheses, and as the opportunity structure is only an indicator for influences which have to be spelled out precisely, the social order is chosen as the primary perspective. The primary question shall be how *normative* rules of a national society determine factual actions and attitudes of actors. Yet social structure and social history necessarily are complementing perspectives. For, in order to isolate the impact of normative reference points, the impact of the relevant factual opportunity structure must be empirically controlled.

**Figure 1. Multi-level model “Social order and life chances“**



The central question of the *Graduiertenkolleg* is shown in the multi-level model of figure 1. The arrow from life chances to attitudes and actions designates the micro-social tradition, and the macro-social tradition of empirical social research is shown by the arrow from social order and social structure/social history to attitudes and actions.

### **1.2.2 Domains of Social Life**

If representations of the people constitute the broad base of a social order and a constitution constitutes the firm base, then the *political constitution* of a national society is to be regarded as the *first* dimension of a social order. It is an order of orders. Therefore, from a legal point of view, the remaining domains of social life are subordinate to the political constitution; however, with regard to people they have an equal rank. In the following, the domains will be

described according to their dominant form of social action – domination, exchange, association, appropriation – and to their fundamental institutions – law, market, organization, media.

### ***Political Constitution: Domination under the Rule of Law***

The political constitution regulates the domination of some members of a national society over others in the form of laws. It determines the *citizens' rights* in expressing and realizing their interests. It contains the design of the organizations of the state and its collective actors. It delimits the *range of actions* of the state and its organizations and restricts it against the pre-political domains of the family and of religion, thus determining the fundamental principles of each social domain, especially of the law itself.

Political constitutions may be classified according to the following dimensions (Brettschneider 1994, Kimmel 1994): (1) *Form of the state*: State presidency, partition of power, multi chamber vs. single chamber parliamentarism, state goals; (2) *Citizens' rights* (Janoski 1998: 29-39, IDEA 2006); (3) *Participatory rights* (Freedom House); (4) *Regional organization*: Federalism – Unitarism.

Below the constitution, the social structure of politics can be described by the established power relations between collective actors: (1) *Efficiency of government* (Kaufmann u.a. 2006); (2) *Party system*: Fractionalization (Rae 1968); (3) *Degree of corporatism*: Association as a second means of political mediation next to parties; intermediate organizations (Janoski 1998: 148-154); (4) *Degree of state interventionism* (van Deth / Elff 2004); (5) *De facto opportunities of participation* (UNDP 2004).

As to *social history*, de facto establishment of democracy is the main dimension: (1) *Time point of establishment* (Curtis / Baer / Grabb 2001) and degree of democratization (Schofer / Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001); (2) *Form of democracy*: parliamentary vs. presidential, competitive vs. concordance, majority vs. consensus (Kaiser 1997, Schmidt 1997: 217-253, Lijphart 1999: 3-8, Denters / van der Kolk 2008, Gabriel / Walter-Rogg 2008, Neller 2008, Roller / Rudi 2008); (3) *Openness to participation and to social movements* (Kriesi u.a. 1995), (4) *People's opportunities to control government* (van Deth / Elff 2004); (5) *factual vs. effective democracy* (Welzel / Inglehart / Klingemann 2003).

### ***Economic Constitution: Exchange on Markets***

The *economic constitution* comprises, as part of the political constitution, the fundamental rules for the exchange on markets, for example property rights, the right to strike, and freedom of coalitions; moreover, some constitutions explicitly endorse economic goals, such as full employment or the social obligations of the state (Brettschneider 1994: 470-471, Kimmel 1994: 39).

Beyond the political constitution, the economic constitution can be determined by the relations between economic subjects and their representatives: (1) the cooperation between economic parties in different „varieties of capitalism“ (Esping-Andersen 1990, Breitmeier u.a. 2006, Höpner 2007), (2) the degree of inclusion of social groups into production, and (3) the institutional regulation of the relations between management and labor, (Heidenreich 1997: 304-306, Ebbinghaus / Visser 1994); (4) the independence of bureaucracies regulating the economic order: central bank, control of monopolies (Grosser 1994: 391-404).

*Social structure* and *social history* can be measured by the „wealth of nations“, GDP or HDI (Human Development Index) (UNDP 2004), by employment rates (Traxler 2002, OECD 2004), labor markets (Esping-Andersen 1999: 99-142), income inequality (Deininger / Squire 2007, WIDER 2007), start-up activities (Sternberg u.a 2006) and failures, number of strikes, and cases of corruption (Transparency International 2007).

### ***Civil Constitution: Associating in Organizations***

Politics are juxtaposed to the „civil society“, in which „citizens“ are related by descentence or may relate to each other at will. The *civil constitution* regulates the association within organizations beyond domination and exchange, or in positive terms: in pre-political, biologically based or socially constructed organizations. Here, the most important forms are (1) the relations of descentence out of which have grown (2) social security systems, and which is the bearer of (3) voluntary associations.

(1) *Descentence*: In many countries, the family – the cohabitation of a couple and of two generations in a household – is protected by the political constitution (Brettschneider 1994: 470-471). It is the core unit of the *social structure* and its change, namely *social history*.

(2) *Systems of Social Security*: have developed out of family relations (Neumann / Schaper 1998, Weber / Leienbach / Dohle 1991). Their first dimension is, therefore, how far security is granted by them rather than by the family. Insofar as the former is the case, additional dimensions become relevant: obligatory insurance of the whole or only parts of the population, financing by contributions or taxes, provision of money or services (Decommodification, Esping-Andersen 1990); corporatism vs. etatism (Kohl 1999: 322); risks included (Hradil 2004: 240-242). *Social structure* und *social history* can be measured by membership in the system and its change.

(3) *Voluntary Associations*: Here, membership serves purposes that can be ordered on a continuum from higher to smaller self-relatedness: the *representation of interests* according to occupation, region, denomination, and family status (labor unions, professional associations, parents' associations) (Ebbinghaus / Visser 2000); *planning of leisure* (sports clubs, cultural associations); the *well-being of other people* (Red Cross, Environment Protection) (Meulemann 2008a). Moreover, voluntary association may be classified according to the strength of *state regulation* and of *corporate self organization* (Janoski 1998: 129-133, Schofer / Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001: 810-815). – *Social structure* and *social history* are measured by membership and work in associations and their change.

### ***Cultural Constitution: Appropriation of Media***

The cultural constitution regulates the appropriation of objectified meaning elements. Meaning elements can be transmitted in objectified forms through technical media – from writing to broadcasting – and – as a possibility implied through the transmission – stored. Media may expand or displace interpersonal communication. The appropriation may demand more or less exertion, it may be intentional or incidental; furthermore, meaning elements may be appropriated with or without a helping mediator. Depending on whether the appropriation is intentional or incidental and whether it is undertaken individually or via some mediator, one can distinguish between three domains to be regulated in the cultural constitution: (1) education, (2) public communication, and (3) religion.

(1) The *educational system* relies on professional mediators for an intentional appropriation of the cultural heritage. – The political constitution regulates at which age, through which agents (public or private ones), and in which organizational structure education is carried out – *Social structure* and *social history* are measured by indicators of supply and demand (Klös / Weiß 2003, OECD 2005).

(2) The *public communication* is the reception of a program in a “disperse” audience. Appropriation is not intentional and not mediated through persons. – Here again, the political constitution regulates the organizational structure (public vs. private owners) (Schmitt-Beck 2000, 2001, Esser / Pfetsch 2003). – *Social structure* and *social history* can be measured by indicators constructed from content analyses (European Audiovisual Observatory 2005) and mass surveys (Gellner 1994, International Marketing Committee 2003, Neller 2008, Schmitt-Beck 2008).

(3) *Religion* gives an answer to the question of the wherefrom and the whereto of life, which can be codified and administered by churches. The appropriation of such an answer is intentional and mediated by person. – Here again, the *political constitution* regulates the organization structure (Marshall 2000, US Department of State 2006). – *Social structure* and *social history are measured* by indicators of denominational belonging and church practice (Barrett / Kurian / Johnson 2001).

### 1.3 Work Steps

Two classes of hypotheses on the impact of a country property on target person properties can be formulated: it either affects the level of the target variable or the effect of some independent person variable on the target variable. The first class will be designated as *level hypotheses*, the second as *effect hypotheses* (van de Vijver 2007: 342). Looking back on figure 1, level hypotheses complete the arrow from the national society to the actor by pointing to “Attitudes/Actions”, effect hypotheses by pointing to the arrow from “Life Chances: Opportunity profile” to “Attitudes/Actions”.

In the courses, graduates will learn (1) to specify these two kinds of hypotheses according to general rules for their specific research topic, (2) to translate them in sequence of research questions and corresponding data analyses, and (2) to combine data sources for persons and countries in order to examine these hypotheses.

#### 1.3.1 Hypotheses for National societies

##### *Level Hypotheses: Social Differentiation and Choices of Corporate Actors*

Level hypotheses must be explained by a specific mechanism on the macro-level. This is obvious when the macro-variable is „global“, i.e. not derived from micro-variables. Yet this is also valid when the macro-variable is “analytic”, i.e. derived from a micro-variable – as will be shown in the following example.

Rich people more often engage in voluntary associations than poor people – no matter whether “people” signifies persons or countries. On the level of persons, having a high income is a resource which facilitates engagement in voluntary associations; therefore, the higher a person’s income, the higher the engagement in voluntary associations. On the level of countries, the higher the Gross Domestic Product per capita of a country, the higher is the mean engagement in voluntary associations. But why? The fact that the average citizen is richer in richer countries and therefore has more resources can no longer explain the country differenc-



es, once the income of persons has been taken into account (Kittel 2006: 656). Therefore, such an explanation must identify mechanisms at the country level. Such a mechanism could be as follows: economic progress leads to societal and occupational differentiation, which increasingly requires the organization of interests in associations; that is, it enlarges the supply and, consequently, the demand of associations (Meulemann 2008a).

Level hypotheses on country effects rest on either one of two arguments. The first argument is *developmental*. It refers – in accord with the sociological tradition from Durkheim (1893) onwards – to *social differentiation*, which functions as a basic process from which further developments result. It constructs a chain of incremental societal processes, which are not under the direct control of politics and, therefore, cannot be easily stopped or reverted. Three such intermediating developments will be mentioned. Firstly, social differentiation establishes *social subsystems*, functionally specified to serve needs formerly passed unnoticed in everyday life (Luhmann 1968). In particular, systems of social security substitute informal networks and exonerate them so that they can more easily serve for less basic needs, such as enjoying social gatherings for their own sake (van der Meer et al., 2008). Second, social differentiation leads to *pluralization* of social cleavages. A greater number of social positions means more diversity of interests, so that more associations are founded. This increasing supply of associations in turn increases the participation of people in associations (Meulemann 2008a). Thirdly, social differentiation increases *social inequality*, which in turn reduces social trust (Neller 2008).

As the examples show, social differentiation is the driving force behind the development of the *opportunity structure* of a country. Yet its offspring developments can, but do not need to be beneficial for the accumulation of social capital. Just as social differentiation proceeds slowly, the opportunity structure of a country has a strong gravity or path dependency and cannot be changed overnight. One may generalize that social differentiation affects the opportunity structure rather than the social order of a country.

The second argument refers to *choices of collective actors* – parliaments and governments, churches and unions, firms and associations – at branching points in the history of a country, which could have been made otherwise and can be revised later on. They produce *events* critical for a country's development. Thus, the present “corporatist” social-political regime in Germany still reflects the social policy of Bismarck during the 1870s; and Great Britain has switched only recently, through Thatcher's reforms in the 1980s, from a “corporatist” to a “liberal” regime. Similarly, European countries have become “Catholic”, “Protestant” or “Mixed” since the Thirty-Years-War, resulting in territorial re-alignments, and West Germany has been transformed from a “Catholic” to a “Mixed” country through the influx of refugees after the Second World War. Recently, Eastern European countries have switched from a state socialistic to a capitalistic social order. In these examples, the choices of collective actors have changed the *social order* of a country almost overnight. They have re-set the normative frame within which social differentiation and its offspring developments continue to proceed with their inherent gravity. They may affect some of these offspring developments sooner, some later, and some not at all. One may generalize that choices of collective actors affect the social order, but not the opportunity structure – at least not directly and immediately.

### ***Effect Hypotheses: Reinforcement and Compensation***

Effect hypotheses contend an interaction between country properties and person properties. They may or may not be accompanied by a corresponding level hypothesis. Furthermore, one may distinguish two kinds of effect hypotheses according to the sign of the effect: reinforce-

ment and compensation hypotheses. Examples will be given for two of the four logical possibilities: (1) A reinforcement hypothesis without a corresponding level hypothesis, and (2) a compensation hypothesis with a corresponding level hypothesis.

(1) *Reinforcement of the effect of social trust as a person's property on political engagement through a climate of social trust.* Both effects have the same, in this case, positive, sign; the interaction effect is positive. On the one hand, if mean social trust is high, trustful people can act, as they feel inclined to; express opinions, discuss politics, and participate in decisions without fear of resentment, revenge or derision. The effect of social trust on political involvement can be strong. On the other hand, if mean social trust is low, trust is unlikely to be reciprocated so that it cannot become a forceful motivation to get involved politically. The effect of social trust on political involvement should be weak (van Deth 2008).

However, a *main* effect of mean social trust on mean political involvement has not been justified by this argument and is not easily derived with arguments concerning social differentiation or decisions of collective actors. Social differentiation means more social interaction, which, depending on its quality, may decrease as well as increase trust, and consequently involvement. Moreover, collective actors can decide over tax rates, public health insurances and many other parameters of social systems, but not over mean social trust. Therefore, one should examine cross-level interaction effects without the main effect of the corresponding country context.

(2) *Compensation of the effect of personal union membership through the high degree of union organization in a country.* Workers use their personal union membership – some of their social capital – to attain greater empowerment at the work place. Yet, trade unions seek to improve work place conditions collectively. The more legal means unions have to co-determine work conditions or the more bargaining power unions have relative to employers, the less a worker needs to resort to the personal social strategy to attain empowerment. There is a negative cross-level *interaction* effect of the position of unions in the country and the union membership of persons on their empowerment at the work place.

However, there are also reasons to expect a *main* effect of the position of unions in the country on mean empowerment. The more co-determination is granted to unions and the more bargaining power they have obtained, in brief, the more the balance between collective actors favors unions, the more they can improve the mean empowerment of their clientele. Arguments about the cross-level interaction effects are justified independently from arguments about the main effect of the respective country context, so that both can be examined simultaneously. Moreover, both kinds of arguments refer to the same country context variable: the position of the unions in the country (Meulemann 2008b).

### 1.3.2 Translating Research Questions into Statistical Analyses

#### *Two series Series of General Questions*

For level hypotheses three questions must be asked. (1) Are differences of mean person level variables between countries large enough to justify further examination? (2) If so, do mean differences remain even if person characteristics have been controlled for, which means they are differently distributed within countries and affect the dependent variable? (3) If so, can these remaining mean differences be explained by the country context? For effect hypotheses two more questions must be asked. (4) Are differences of slopes of some explanatory person characteristics big enough to justify further examination? (5) If so, can the slope differences be explained by the country context?

Question (2) differs from question (1) only insofar as independent person level variables are considered. In both questions, means of person variables are compared between countries, but in question (1) the *raw* mean, and in question (2) the *net* (of some person level influence) mean is at stake. Both questions examine whether the variance of the means is large enough to be analyzed further. Both questions, therefore, correspond to question (4) which examines whether the variance of the slopes is large enough to be analyzed further. Questions (1), (2), and (4) do not describe countries by context variables, but treat them as cases designated by proper names. Statistically, question (1) requires an analysis of variance, and questions (2) and (4) require an analysis of covariance; both analyses see countries as “treatments” rather than as bearers of some context variable. Nevertheless, question (1), (2), and (4) are by no means superfluous. If they are answered negatively, something positive is detected: Countries, in spite of their seeming differences, have a similar mean of, and similar effects on, the dependent variables. So far, there are general laws at work and one does not need to care for country contexts. However if they are answered positively, one should go on to questions (3) and (5), which no longer describe countries by their proper names but explain differences between them by context variables.

### *Questions, Analyses Techniques and Equations*

In order to answer the two series of questions, person level variables must be analyzed as dependent on person and country variables *simultaneously*. That is, so-called multi-level analyses must be applied. Statistically, this is a special, namely hierarchical, regression technique (HLM, hierarchical linear model) which is required if the *individuals* of a sample are embedded in *aggregates*, as in our case *persons* within *countries*.<sup>1</sup> HLM-regression, first, regresses an individual level characteristic on individual level characteristics and, second, regresses the intercept and the slope of the first regression on aggregate level characteristics. How questions (1) to (3) are treated in regression equations of the intercept, and questions (4) to (5) in regression equations of the slope is shown in table 2, in the simple case of one explanatory variable on the individual as well as on the aggregate level (Hox 2002: 50-54, 63). For the following, it is assumed, that the individual level variable X is “grand mean centered”, that is, expressed as deviations from the overall mean, so that the intercept of the individual level regression can be interpreted as the mean individual, in our case, the “mean European”. Also it is assumed, that the aggregate level variable Z is centered so that the intercept of the aggregate level regression can be interpreted as the mean of the aggregates, in our case European countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Individuals and aggregates can be many other things besides citizens and countries, e.g.: pupils and schools, workers and firms etc. Therefore, we use the terms “individuals” and “aggregates” to refer to multi-level analysis as a general perspective, and the terms “persons” (or “citizens”) and “countries” to refer to its specific application here.

**Table 2**     **Analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, and multilevel analysis: questions and equations; one individual and one aggregate level predictor**

Analysis	Equations		
	Individual	Aggregate: intercept (=mean)	Aggregate: slope
Variance	$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \varepsilon_{ij}$	(1) $\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j}$	
Covariance	$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$	(2) $\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j}$	(4) $\beta_1 = \gamma_{10} + u_{1j}$
Multi-level	$y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$	(3) $\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} Z_j + u_{0j}$	(5) $\beta_1 = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} Z_j + u_{1j}$
Questions		(1)(2) $V(u_{0j})$ significant? (3) $\gamma_{01}$ and $V(u_{0j})$ significant?	(4) $V(u_{1j})$ significant? (5) $\gamma_{11}$ and $V(u_{1j})$ significant?

In the first line, the analysis of variance, question (1) is treated. On the individual level, there is no independent but a dependent variable with varying means in the aggregates. If the intercept equation is inserted into the individual level equation, the individual level dependent variable is decomposed into the grand mean  $\gamma_{00}$ , an effect  $u_o$  for each aggregate  $j$ ,  $u_{0j}$ , and an error for each individual  $i$  in each aggregate  $j$ ,  $e_{ij}$ . In our case,  $u_{0j}$  is the value for country  $j$  which deviates from the social capital of the “mean European”, and  $e_{ij}$ , the value for individual  $i$ , deviates from the mean social capital in country  $j$ . Statistically, it is tested whether the variance of  $u_{0j}$ , that is the variance of the country means, is significant and, furthermore, whether it is large enough relative to the total variance. As a rule of thumb, the percentage of between country variance of the total variance, the so called intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), should not fall below .10.

In the second line, the analysis of covariance, questions (2) and (4) are treated. *As for question (2)*, the intercept equation is of the same kind as in question (1). But the intercept stems from a regression of  $Y$  on  $X$ ;  $\gamma_{00}$  now is the grand mean, net of the effect of  $X$ . That is, different distributions of  $X$  in the aggregates have been taken account of, so that the intercept no longer reflects the composition, but only the context. Statistically, the same kind of test as for question (1) is carried out for the means net of the effect of  $X$ . Also one additional test whether  $\gamma_{00}$  significantly deviates from zero is executed but it is not substantively interesting so that it will not be considered for this and the following questions.

*As for question (4)*, the equation for the slope has the same form as the equation for the intercept in question (1):  $\gamma_{10}$  is the mean slope which holds for all individuals in all aggregates, and  $u_{1j}$  is the value added to the slope for aggregate  $j$ . If the slope equation is inserted into the individual level equation, then  $X$  affects  $Y$  in two ways: the mean slope and the addition to it for each aggregate. Statistically, it is tested if the variance of the slopes  $u_{1j}$  is significant such that an explanation of slope differences by the aggregate context is worth the effort. Furthermore, it is also tested whether the mean slope  $\gamma_{10}$  deviates from zero. Yet as this test refers to the mean individual level effect it is left out of consideration in the following examination of the aggregate level effects.

In the third line, the multi-level analysis proper, question (3) and (5) are treated. On the individual level, nothing has been changed in comparison to the second line. On the aggregate level, a context variable  $Z$  explains the intercepts or slopes. *As for question (3)*,  $\gamma_{00}$  is now the mean net of the effect of  $X$  and  $Z$ . Statistically, it is tested whether the effect of  $Z$  on the

means,  $\gamma_{01}$ , is significant and whether there remains a significant variance of  $u_{0j}$  after  $Z$  has explained some of the variance of the intercepts so that one should search for further explanatory aggregate variables. *As for question (5)*,  $\gamma_{10}$  is now the mean slope, net of the effect of  $X$  and  $Z$ . It is tested whether the effect of  $Z$  on the slopes,  $\gamma_{11}$ , is significant and whether there remains a significant variance of  $u_{1j}$  after  $Z$  has explained some of the variance of the slopes so that one should again search for further explanatory aggregate variables.

Thus, these two sequences of questions can be translated into sequences of statistical analyses, which will be an important part of the teaching program.

### 1.3.3 Finding Data Sources

(a) *National indicators* of the social order, the social structure and the social history can be found in some data collections, although social structure (Delhey 2001, Noll 2002) is more extensively documented than social order (Brettschneider 1994) and social history (Flora 1983, 1988). Moreover, politics and economics are better documented than civil society and culture. Indicators are found on the Website of the European Social Survey ([www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)) and [www.scp.nl/users/stoop/ess\\_events/links\\_contextual\\_data2003.htm](http://www.scp.nl/users/stoop/ess_events/links_contextual_data2003.htm))<sup>2</sup>:

- *Politics and economics*: AMADEUS, Armingeon u.a. 2004, Armingeon u.a. 2005, BACH, Breitmeier u.a. 2006, Delhey 2001, Esping-Andersen 1999, Fischer-Weltalmanach (jährlich), Gabriel / Brettschneider 1994, Gerhards 2005, Gwartney / Lawson 2006, Huber et al. 2004, Jagers / Gurr 1995, Janoski 1998, Lane / McKay / Newton 1997, Lijphart 1999: 311-315, Norris 2006, Schmidt 1997; Database from EUROSTAT and World Bank (yearly); URL of non-governmental organisations, such as Freedom House, Transparency International, Amnesty International.
- *Civil society. Family*: Pfenning / Bahle 2000, United Nations Development Program 2004. *Social Security*: Esping-Andersen 1990: ix-xi, Huber et al. 2004, Weber / Leinbach / Dohle 1991, Scruggs 2004, MISSOC. *Voluntary associations*: Anheier / Salamon 2001, Ebbinghaus / Visser 2000, Salamon / Sokolowski 2001, 2004, Salamon et al. 1999, OECD 2001, Golden / Lange / Wallerstein 2002.
- *Culture. Education*: Klös / Weiß 2003, OECD 2005. *Mass media*: Lane / McKay / Newton 1997: 165-182, Hasebrink / Herzog 2004. *Religion*: Lane / Errson 1995, Barrett / Kurian / Johnson 2001, Norris / Inglehart 2004, Marshall 2000, US Department of State 2006.

(b) *Cross-nationally comparative Surveys*:

- Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF) of selected national household panels,
- Citizen, Involvement, and Democracy Study (CID),
- Eurobarometer (EB),
- European Community Household Panel (ECHP),
- European Social Survey (ESS),
- European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
- European Values Study (EVS),
- Family and Fertility Surveys (FFS),
- International Social Justice Project (ISJP),
- International Social Survey Program (ISSP),

<sup>2</sup> For the countries of the ESS 2002 there has been even prepared a data set of macro-variables: <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/files/2003/ESSMacrodata.xls>; 19.9.2007

- Labour Force Survey (LFS),
- Luxembourg Income (LIS) and Employment Study (LES),
- Program for International Student Assessment (PISA).

To harmonize social structural variables see: Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik / Wolf 2003, Statistisches Bundesamt 2004, Leiulfstrud / Bison / Jensberg 2005.

## 1.4 Research projects

Table 3 presents 10 research projects according to the actors investigated and (exemplary) variables, within the four domains of social life.

**Table 3 Overview on research projects**

Do- main	Coordinator	Title	Actors	Exemplary Variables			Data
				Dependent	Indep: Macro	Indep: Micro	
Politics	(a) Kaiser	Programmatic supply strategies of political parties	Parties	Programs	Political Institutions	Voters' Attitudes	Comparative Manifestos Project, EB
	(b) Nußberger	Constitution and Individual in Central and Eastern Europe	Persons	Identification with values of constitution	Position in Constitution	Appeals	Data of the European Court for Human Rights
Economics	(c) Andreß	Welfare State Regulation of Life Cycle Risks	Persons	Income	Decommodification	Education	National Household Panels, ECHP
	(d) Fetchenhauer	Determinants of financial honesty in cross-cultural comparison	Persons	Financial Honesty	Styles of Education	Religion	WVS
	(e) Fuest	Taxes and Business Decisions in Cross-National Comparison	Firms	Investments	Tax System	Size of Firms	Date from Firms
CiviSociety	(f) Bomsdorf	Demographic Development: Quantitative and Qualitative Determinants	Persons	Fertility	Family Support Programs	Education	LIS, LES, FFS
	(g) Schulz-Nieswandt	Comparative analysis of Long-term nursing care policy regimes	Persons	Satisfaction	Regime of Political Domains	Role Taking	EVS, EB, Official Statistics
	(h) Wagner	Comparative Family Research	Persons	Marital Stability	Infrastructure	Womens' labour Participation	FFS, ISSP, ECHPI
Culture	(i) Jagodzinski	Life Satisfaction and Quality of Life	Persons	Satisfaction	Level of Provision	Value orientations	EVS, EB, ESS
	(j) Meulemann	Religiosity and Civil Society	Persons	Engagement	Developmental Stage	Religiosity	ESS, CID

### *(a) Programmatic Supply Strategies of Political Parties (Prof. Kaiser, Prof. Jagodzinski)*

Contrary to what the first generation of spatial political theories assumed, political parties do not react in a mechanical way to preference changes in the electorate. Rather they follow proactive strategies which, of course, are constrained by institutional opportunity structures (Kai-

ser 2006; Kaiser/Franzmann 2006). Recent research in this field is based on salience theory. Parties emphasize those issues where they believe they are “issue-owners”. Analyses in this tradition are based on the “Comparative Manifestos Project” (CMP) database which comprises quantitative counts of issue statements from parties in 25 countries in 364 elections in the period of 1945 to 1998 (and in 51 countries in the period of 1990 to 2003). The leading question of the suggested dissertation projects is, in which way the programmatic supply strategies of parties (micro level) depend on the following two factors: first the interaction with other political parties and second the institutional arrangements of the political systems in which they operate (macro level). Linking micro-level to macro-level data allows testing *level hypotheses* as well as *effect hypotheses*.

*Exemplary dissertation projects* : (1) To what extent do institutional arrangements such as the voting system structure the potential of established political parties to incorporate new social trends programmatically in the context of party competition? (2) Do federal institutions lead to party competition based on more valence issues than arrangements in unitary states? (3) Can we identify extremist political parties by a very low emphasis level on valence issues? (4) Is there a systematic relationship between level of democratic satisfaction and the number of valence issues in the party system?

***(b) Constitution and Individual in Central and Eastern Europe (Prof. Nußberger, Prof. Schulz-Nieswandt)***

Constitutions determine the basic structure and the value system of the State. Primarily, it is the task of the governmental bodies to ensure the implementation of the constitutional provisions. However, if modern constitutions include catalogues of human rights and freedoms as well as constitutional complaint procedures every citizen is authorized to claim constitutional values on his or her own behalf. The most recent development does not only allow individuals to claim their rights within the respective national constitutional system, but also provides for a procedure of action against their own state on the international level. On this basis individuals can become attorneys for the implementation of certain values against their own countries.

The goal of the project is to analyze these new developments in different countries of the EU, especially in the new Central and Eastern European Member States, on a comparative basis, and thereby to elucidate in how far the individuals embrace the values enshrined in the constitution and adopt them as their own. *Level assumptions* are dedicated to the influence of constitution on the complaint attitudes, *effect assumptions* to the influence of the personal identification with the constitution on the complaint attitudes.

*Exemplary dissertation projects*: (1) Analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: Which deficits of national legal orders are subjects of complaints on the international level? (2) Examination of the definition of the legal position of the individual within the framework of constitutional law. (3) Comparative analysis of the forms of legal protection, to which an individual is entitled in the sphere of constitutional law. (4) Minorities as subjects of constitutional rights.

***(c) Welfare State Regulation of Life Cycle Risks (Prof. Andreß, Prof. Schulz-Nieswandt, Prof. Wagner)***

How does the welfare state affect the social risks that individuals experience in life?

*Exemplary dissertation projects*: (1) How do public policies (especially family policies) modify the consequences of partnership dissolution? (2) How does the taxation system provide

incentives for partnership and fertility decisions? (3) How do labour market policies and the system of industrial relations influence the size and the structure of the low-income sector?

***(d) Determinants of Financial Honesty in Cross-Cultural Comparison (Prof. Fetchenhauer, Prof. Kaiser)***

Financial honesty increases trust in a given society and thus lowers the transaction costs of economic activities. Previous studies investigating these relationships were done merely on an aggregate level (Fetchenhauer & van der Vegt, 2001). Possible dissertation projects should test, whether these results also hold on at individual level investigating the relationships between: (1) Financial honesty and economic success. (2) Financial honesty and criminal behaviour. (3) Determinants of financial honesty in cross-cultural comparison (e.g., educational style, religiosity). The main goal of these projects lies in the test of a number of complex hypotheses stating main and moderator effects between different levels of analysis. Examples of such hypotheses are: (1) the higher degree of interpersonal trust in a given society (macro variable), the more honest are the inhabitants of this country (micro variable). (2) The lower the degree of religiosity in a given country (macro variable), the lower the relationship between religiosity and financial honesty (both latter variables measured on the level of the individuals).

***(e) Taxes and Entrepreneurial Decisions in Cross-Cultural Comparison (Prof. Fuest, Prof. Andreß)***

The European Common market has triggered off an intensive taxation competition between countries. Simultaneously, European Law increasingly affects national systems of firm taxation (Fuest 2005, Becker / Fuest 2004). Using micro data of firms from different countries, the effects of taxation on entrepreneurial decisions on investments in productive capacities, financial structures, employment, research and development, and the accounting of gains shall be examined. *Level hypotheses* refer to the impact of the national taxation on these decisions.

*Exemplary dissertation projects:* (1) Effects of national taxation systems on financing strategies of firms. (2) Effective taxation of investments in cross-national comparison. (3) Taxation and international direct investments.

***(f) The Demographic Development and its Quantitative and Qualitative Determinants (Bomsdorf, Wagner)***

The aim of the project is to compare the interdependency between family and social policies and fertility, mortality and migration in different nations. There are *level hypotheses* on the influence of national family support policy on fertility and *effect hypotheses* on the question whether this policy affects the influence of education on fertility.

*Exemplary dissertation projects:* (1) Does fertility increase with the labor force participation rate among women? (2) Which factors determine differences in life expectancy in cross-national comparison? (3) How much social and economic inequality exists in the EU and how is this related to the demographic development of a country?

***(g) Comparative Analysis of Long-term Nursing Care Policy Regimes (Prof. Schulz-Nieswandt, Prof. Fetchenhauer)***

The development of nursing care arrangements on the micro level between informal arrangements of private households or networks and institutional solutions in the context of the need of a complex cross-sectoral, multi-functional and multi-professional integration of medical care, rehabilitation, nursing and complementary social services on the meso level of the land-



scapes of public, non-profit- and market provisions, depending on legal frameworks on the national and European macro level – to sum up: the whole process as a multi-level system – depends on cultural codes, social norms and on the modalities of intra-personal habituation and cultural history of these embeddedness-mechanism. What is the grammar of this multi-level system? What are the gender-related cultural codes and the patterns of social role resulting from this grammar? What are the personal orders of generating and reproduction of this grammar in the context of path-dependent welfare mixtures?

Possible projects of specified dissertation are related to the crowding-out-discussion, the social construction of gender-order and understandings of ageing, the role of religion, the role of personal competences, coping-styles, resilience- and empathy-potentials etc.

### ***(h) Comparative Family Research (Wagner, Andreß)***

What are the social and economic consequences of the inclusion into different partnership arrangements and families? Not only secondary analyses of international data sets will be performed, but also meta-analyses of existing surveys and empirical findings (Wagner/Weiß 2003). Wagner and Weiß (2006) prove the *effect hypothesis* which states that in those European countries with rather traditional marriage norms premarital cohabitation has a stronger effect on marriage stability than in countries with less traditional marriage norms (see also Wagner 1997).

*Exemplary dissertation projects:* (1) The performance of families: What do partnership or marriage contribute to the objective and subjective well-being of men and women? Does this performance depend on the level of modernization or differentiation of a society? (2) Socialization success of families: How well can the family perform socialization in different social and economic environments? (3) Consequences of parenthood in middle or old age: What consequences does parenthood (or childlessness) have in the later phases of the life course?

### ***(i) Determinants of Life Satisfaction (Prof. Jagodzinski, Prof. Meulemann)***

As a *level hypothesis* it shall be examined whether the developmental stage of a country increases mean life satisfaction; as an *effect hypothesis* it shall be examined whether the impact of value orientations on life satisfaction varies according to developmental stage.

*Exemplary dissertation projects:* (1) Happiness and Life satisfaction: Conceptualization and measurement. (2) Cultural determinants of life satisfaction. (3) Life satisfaction and social integration. (4) What is the impact of self-orientation and collectivity orientation on life satisfaction (5) How determine economic wealth and socio-political regimes the impact of life conditions on life satisfaction?

### ***(j) Religiosity and Civil Society (Prof. Meulemann, Prof. Fetchenhauer)***

In many countries, religiosity increases volunteering (Schofer / Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001: 819f., Halman / Pettersson 2003: 181). However, resources and prosocial attitudes (e.g. trust) equally do so. These effects shall be compared between countries of different developmental level, different ethnic and denominational composition and different political traditions. In doing so, a distinction shall be made between self-oriented forms of engagement – e.g. in sports clubs or parents' associations – and collectivity-oriented forms – e.g. in environmental movements. The *level hypothesis* shall be examined that a protestant tradition increases engagement in comparison to catholic and other traditions; as well as the *effect hypothesis* that the impact of religiosity on engagement depends on the developmental level of a country.

*Exemplary dissertation projects:* (1) How do religiosity, civil engagement and their relation differ between countries? (2) How does the impact of religion on engagement vary between different forms of the engagement? – As religiosity is a subset or a determinant of value orientations, a close collaboration with project (i) „life satisfaction “ which examines similar variable on micro and macro level is planned.

These substantive projects are supplemented by two methodological ones which are concerned with the work steps in 1.3.2 und 1.3.3.

### ***Survey Measurement Instruments in Cross National Research (Jagodzinski, Andreß, Meulemann)***

An important progress of cross-nationally comparative research is the development of comparable measurement instruments.

*Exemplary dissertation projects:* (1) Reliability and validity of indices of class. (2) Different meanings of education in sociological theories. (3) Measurement of dimensions of religiosity. (4) Measurement of interpersonal und institutional trust.

### ***Statistical Analysis of Cross-Nationally Comparative Datasets (Andreß, Bomsdorf, Jagodzinski, Meulemann)***

The structural, metric, and scalar equivalence of measurement scales between countries (van de Vijver 2007: 347) can be examined via confirmatory multi-group factor analyses, such that factor scores may be used in multi-level analyses.

*Exemplary dissertation projects:* Bias and equivalence, combination of multi-level analyses with confirmatory factor analyses.

## **2 Study program**

The *Graduiertenkolleg* is integrated within the interdisciplinary study program of the Cologne Graduate School (that is the general dissertation program) on fundamental theories and methods such that it can concentrate on its specific questions, data and methods. The program is shown in schema 1. It is given in English. Each participant is obliged to attend all classes and to attain a „Leistungsnachweis“ (Credit) in the three courses marked with „LN“ of the first year and in the two *seminars* of the second year. “SWS” mean two lecture hours in a week during the term.

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**Schema 1: Study program**


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**1. Year: Starting phase: 1. Term**

- (1) Lecture: Does the National Context Matter? Theories and Empirical Results from Social Science Research (2 SWS; each of the teachers)
- (2) Seminar: Logic and Design of Comparative Research (2 SWS; Jagodzinski, Kaiser) – LN
- (3) Course on interdisciplinary methods and theory of the Cologne Graduate School (2 SWS; recommended are: Advanced Econometrics, Survey Methodology, Rational Choice Analysis, or Institutional Analysis) – LN

**1. Year: Starting phase: 2. Term**

- (4) Seminar: Data Sources of Comparative Social and Economic Research (2 SWS; Jagodzinski, Bomsdorf)
- (5) Lecture and Tutorial: Hierarchical Linear Regression Models (2 SWS; Andreß, Bomsdorf, Jagodzinski, Meulemann)
- (6) Tutorial and Workshop (2 days): Proposal Writing (1 SWS; coordinator of the Graduiertenkolleg)
- (7) Further course on interdisciplinary theories and methods of the Cologne Graduate School (2 SWS; recommended are: Advanced Econometrics, Survey Methodology, Rational Choice Analysis, or Institutional Analysis) – LN

**2. Year: Consolidation phase: 3. Term**

- (8) Seminar: Advanced methods for the analysis of comparative data (Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches) (2 SWS; Andreß, Meulemann, Kaiser)
- (9) Seminar on Current Problems of Comparative Social and Economic Research (2\*2 SWS):
  - a. Analyses of Welfare States, Labour Markets and the Economy (Fuest, Schulz-Nieswandt, Andreß)
  - b. Analyses of the Legal and Political System (Fuest, Kaiser, Nußberger)
- (10) Workshop on Selected Topics (3-4 days; each teacher)

**2. Year: Consolidation phase: 4. Term**

- (11) Seminar on Current Problems of Comparative Social and Economic Research (2\*2 SWS):
  - a. Analyses of Social Structure and Demographical Change (Bomsdorf, Wagner)
  - b. Analyses of Values, Norms, and Culture (Fetchenhauer, Jagodzinski, Meulemann)
- (12) Workshop on selected topics (3-4 days; each teacher)

**3. Year: Final phase: 5. Term**

- (13) Research Seminar of the Research and Training Group (2 SWS; all teachers)

**3. Year: Final phase: 6. Term**

- (14) Research Seminar of the Research and Training Group (2 SWS; all teachers)
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